#41: AEI on Taiwan: Constitution, Defense, China Problems. Koxinga after Chiang. 07.8.9=3 10:30pm.

AEI: American Enterprise Institute on Taiwan: 1)-3):

1)Constitution: http://tinyurl.com/2vfuwo

'Constitutional Change in Taiwan: Provocation or Democratic Consolidation?' Monday, January 22, 2007; Location: Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

"" Since Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 pledge to pursue constitutional revision, Chinese commentators have warned that Chen will manipulate the process to achieve de jure independence from the mainland, a step it says would lead to war. Despite Beijing’s saber rattling, constitutional reform on Taiwan has been a central part of the island’s twenty years’ evolution from authoritarianism to democracy. What are the current parameters of debate on constitutional revision in Taipei? Will political polarization in Taiwan prevent consensus on the next step in changing the constitution? What are the American interests in an issue that may open the next cross-Strait rift? On January 22, AEI will hold a half-day conference to discuss these and other questions relating to the prospects for constitutional change in Taiwan. ""
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More Information:
Rebecca Weissburg
American Enterprise Institute
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-862-7188
Fax: 202-862-7163
E-mail: RWeissburg@aei.org

© 2005 American Enterprise Institute | All Rights Reserved

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2) Defense: http://tinyurl.com/2ypymj

'Don't Belittle Taiwan's Effort to Defend Itself', by Gary J. Schmitt, Dan Blumenthal ; AEI posted: Friday, September 2, 2005 ; From "Wall Street Journal Asia", September 2, 2005:

"" Time and again, in meeting after meeting, one hears the following refrain from American policy experts when talking about Taiwan: “If they aren’t serious about defending themselves, why should we risk our blood and treasure to help them fend off a Chinese attack?” The proximate cause for this and similar remarks is that Taiwan has not yet purchased a major package of military systems offered in 2001 by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush. That package includes eight diesel submarines, 12 P-3 submarine-hunting planes, and several batteries of PAC-3 anti-missile missiles. The delay is all too often used to convey the impression that Taiwan is free riding, counting on U.S. carriers and jets (and of course American sailors and airmen) to deter China rather than relying on its own efforts.

The truth about Taiwan’s defense effort, when examined more closely, is very different. From 1996 to 2003, for instance, Taiwan was the second largest recipient of arms purchased from the U.S. Nor did the spending stop when Chen Shui-bian became president in 2001. Among the major purchases his government has made since then are the American-built Kidd class destroyers, an advanced early-warning radar, upgraded Hawk anti-air missile systems, and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution system, a system designed to upgrade Taiwan’s command, control and communication capabilities between military services and platforms.

Nor has his government ignored the software side of military modernization. It has spent tens of millions to send hundreds of Taiwanese officers to the U.S. for training and exchanges with the Pentagon and defense experts to update its military planning and strategy. At the same time, the Chen administration successfully implemented a legislative package of defense reforms designed to ensure civilian control of the military, establish a joint staff, and create a civilian strategic-planning department that would rationalize defense decision making and make it less service parochial.

When it comes to the Bush administration’s big-ticket arms offers, the story is more complicated. While there is plenty of blame to go around, the least guilty party in finalizing the purchase has been the Chen administration. Although the Bush team should be lauded for approving the sale of systems that had been denied by the Clinton administration, it was always unrealistic to think Taiwan could absorb $30 billion worth of new weapon systems in a short period when its procurement and acquisition budget has historically averaged $400-500 million a year.

Further complicating matters was the fact that the biggest of the big-ticket items--the eight submarines--was an unknown quantity. The U.S. no longer produces diesel-powered submarines and potential European partners were too intimidated by China to partner openly with U.S. contractors to fill the order. As a result, the Pentagon went through a time-consuming process of developing a price for a notional submarine that fits Taiwan’s specifications. This resulted in Taiwan not getting any estimate of the cost of the submarines until early 2003. Similar problems plagued the purchase of the P-3s, causing further delays. With no high-level champion in the U.S. government to oversee the implementation of the sale, there was little bureaucratic urgency to move the programs along.

But, since the end of 2003, the main cause of the delay has come from within Taiwan. The Chen administration inherited a defense and military establishment whose elite had come up through a system in which Kuomintang party indoctrination was the norm and who, for its own political reasons, favored ground forces. A good number of senior officers were not only openly hostile to President’s Chen’s political party, the Democratic Progressive Party, but also lukewarm about a new defense strategy that would emphasize air and sea power. One consequence was that, for a short period, key figures in Taiwan’s defense establishment slowed the procurement process--a problem President Chen fixed when he changed defense chiefs the day after he was sworn in for his second term in May 2004.

By far the biggest problem has been the effort by the coalition of opposition parties--led by the KMT--to block legislative consideration of the special budget put forward by the government to purchase the systems being offered by Washington. On more than two dozen occasions, the pan-Blue coalition has prevented the measure from even being taken up by the relevant defense committee of Legislative Yuan.

Say what you want about the Chen’s administration’s handling of any number of issues, but the blame for not acting on the weapons package lies squarely with the opposition. Although it is true that defense spending as a percentage of Taiwan’s GDP has declined over the past decade, the largest decline took place in the years when the KMT was still in charge. In any case, Taiwan’s defense burden as a percentage of GDP--at 2.4%--is still greater than virtually all other American allies, and may increase with the recent call by President Chen for the government to spend at least of 3% of the country’s GDP on its defenses by 2008.

Taiwan could certainly do more. But the idea that the Chen administration is not serious about defending Taiwan is largely a tale told by sinologists and American government officials who would like an excuse for the problem of Taiwan to just go away.

But the problem is not going away precisely because Beijing continues to increase its military capability to coerce democratic Taiwan into unification with the mainland. Rather than constantly belittling Taiwan’s effort to defend itself, it would be better to focus on the real issue, which is how to work more closely with Taiwan to address the unprecedented military build-up taking place across the Strait.

Dan Blumenthal is resident fellow at AEI. Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project for the New American Century. ""

AEI Print Index No. 18934
© 2005 American Enterprise Institute | All Rights Reserved.

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3) China Problems: http://tinyurl.com/3bbruk

'China and Taiwan Pose a New Problem', by Gary J. Schmitt, Dan Blumenthal; AEI posted: Friday, March 3, 2006 ; From "Financial Times"(London), March 2, 2006:

"" In early February, the Pentagon issued its Quadrennial Defence Review, a strategic review designed to guide US defence thinking over the next four years. China was the only country highlighted in the 90-plus-page report, with a warning that its decade-long, double-digit increases in military spending had “already” put “regional military balances at risk”. China, the review said, “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States”. ""
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"" The political tectonic plates that divide the Taiwan Strait are shifting, and they are not moving closer toward each other. Understandably, the US wants to maintain a policy--what it calls the “status quo”--that has preserved the peace and allowed both states to prosper economically for some time. But how long can it do so when China’s ambitions to be a great power pull in one direction and Taiwan’s democratic identity pulls in another?

Gary Schmitt is a resident scholar at AEI. Daniel Blumenthal is a resident fellow at AEI ""

AEI Print Index No. 19724
© 2005 American Enterprise Institute | All Rights Reserved.

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Koxinga after Chiang:

'鄭成功 漢化成功', ■ 沈建德

"" 民進黨許添財尊鄭成功為民族英雄，李逸洋主持鄭「開台三四六週年祭典」，而近傳馬邀名導拍「鄭成功傳」。

鄭滅荷留下之羅馬拼音台文，改用漢字；逼台民漢化供其驅使，使台灣和中國「同文同種」。蔣禁閩客語，偽造中國族譜，把台灣人接到中國血統，也製造「同文同種」以利統治。

蔣鄭都知台灣不屬中國，蔣說台灣非中國固有疆域，鄭說東寧與中國版圖渺不相涉。鄭氏一六六一年竊台，殘酷剝削，掠奪土地鎮壓反抗，漢化毒化，逼台民背祖認「漢」，罪行不亞於蔣之征地為黨產、奴役台灣人、耕者有其田、偽造台灣的中國族譜、白色恐怖等。

鄭據台二十二年屠殺不斷，台灣頭到台灣尾，血跡斑斑記於史冊：

（1）諸羅（嘉義縣市）不歸順者盡殺。
（2）搶佔水沙連（林圯埔至斗六間）住民之地不從者殺。
（3）登陸車城鎮壓瑯嶠（恆春）。
（4）屠殺屏北居民記在「番俗六考」。
（5）追殺北港溪上游雲嘉交界之住民。
（6）攻殺台南赤嵌住民占據臺江沿岸，載於「臺灣外記」。
（7）「番俗六考」又記：「沙轆原數百人，為最盛，後被鄭遣劉國軒
殺戮，只餘六人，潛匿海口」。
（8）踏平貓兒干南社（雲林崙背褒忠），屯兵於黃地崙。
（9）鄭經趕殺竹山住民。
（10）「海上事略」載：「偽鄭守雞籠，凡需軍餉，悉差土番（住民）接遞，男女老樨供役，督運辦日酷有加，施鞭韃，因相率為亂，殺諸社商往來人役，新港仔、竹塹等社皆叛。鄭克塽令左協陳絳率兵剿擒，土番（住民）盡遁入山」。

這些集體屠殺應是「三四六」年前的二二八，不是「開台三四六週年」。 ""

（作者為前中興大學企管系副教授）